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Intentions and the 
Logic of Interpretation 
WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM 
What exactly are we doing when we say that an author's inten-
tions should or should not have a role in the interpretation of a 
text? Are we making a claim about a crucial piece of evidence 
which should be taken into account, if at all poss ible? Or are we 
making a claim about grammar or logical character of the whole 
enterprise of interpretation? In this paper I shall mount a modest 
case for the latter way of construing this issue . I shall argue, that 
is, that the debate about intentions has been misplaced.I It has 
less to do with external avowals which an author may or may not 
make about the meaning of his work and much more to do with 
the fundamental goal of the interpretative process as a whole. We 
will begin by sketching more fully the first option and examining 
the case against appeal to intentions on that level. 
When an author's intentions in writing a particular text operate 
as a piece of external evidence, the logic of the situation is 
relatively straightforward. In puzzling over the meaning of a text, 
we normally assemble all sorts of evidence. We take into account 
the genre, the grammar, the style, the literary context, the usus 
loquendi of the words used, the circumstances in which the text 
was written, how it may have been or was received in its day, 
how it may have been composed and put together over time , and 
the like. Alongside these we now place the author's own account 
of what he was doing in writing the text under review. According 
to our hypothetical theory, the author's avowals will be treated as 
decisive in the construal of the text. These avowals may them-
selves be expressed in a variety of ways. They may be written in 
diaries or workbooks; or they may have been enshrined in a 
commentary on the relevant work; or they may have been made in 
some kind of public or private utterance which has been written 
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down and has Of course, the author's intentions may 
have been enshrined in the text itself. One thinks immediately of 
what Luke has to say in his famous prologue or what John says in 
his tantalizing comments towards the end of his gospel. But this is 
so rarely true that we can overlook it for the moment. In any 
case, the appeal would be much the same: the author's avowals 
about his intentions would be treated as having a privileged 
position in the debate about the most appropriate rendering of the 
text. At the very least it would require very strong evidence to 
overturn what the author said he meant on any particular occasion. 
The appeal to intentions as evidence for a particular 
interpretation of a text has not, to my knowledge, been used to 
displace the appeal to other kinds of evidence. Othe r 
considerations are to be included in the process of interpretation; 
the issue is one of status, not exclusivism. Indeed, as applied to 
Holy Scripture the appeal to the intentions of the original author 
was embedded in a profound and hard-won attempt to tac kle 
questions about the meaning of a text in a rigorous and 
intellectually persuasive manner. On the one hand, it was part of 
a move to cut texts loose from dogmatic, theological traditions 
which refused to let them speak for themselves. In earlier times 
the enemy tended to be the classical creeds of the Church , while 
in more recent times the great enemy has been real and imagined 
forms of Fundamentalism. On the other hand, it was an attempt 
to rid scholarship of faulty methods of interpretation--like 
allegory, or hasty, pietistic application--which imposed meanings 
on the text which were clearly not there in the first place. 
Several interesting assumptions about texts and about human 
action are built into this deliberately sketchy account of 
interpretation. It is assumed, for example, that texts and authors 
are not just contingently, but logically, connected. A text is 
demarcated from mere markings on paper by its conceptual 
relation to human action. Texts are in fact human , intentional 
actions. They are the expression of human purposes and 
intentions; they are not mere events which occur as the result of 
natural, Jaw - like happenings in the world; they embody and ma ke 
manifest human consciousness. It is also assumed that, although 
texts are actions of human subjects acting to express certa in 
intentions and purposes, they are also objects in the world and as 
such they possess an independence which stands over against the 
would-be interpreter. However difficult it may be to decipher or 
read them, texts must be approached with great patience and skill 
so that their authors may be heard and understood. They should 
not be railroaded into saying something which their authors did 
not intend them to say. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
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author's intentions have a privileged position in the process of 
interpretation because the author has privileged access to his or 
her intentions. Generally speaking, the human subject knows his 
or her intentions better than an external observer does, or so it is 
widely held. It is this principle which surely operates as the 
warrant for the special place of authorial intention in the debate 
about interpretation. Finally, it is assumed in this account that we 
can draw a distinction between the meaning of a text and the 
significance of a text. The former remains stable; it is that which 
the author intended to convey in the text. To be sure, our 
account of what the author meant may have to change, for new 
evidence about authorial intention may come to light and hence 
lead to revisions in our interpretation. But that is one thing. It is 
another thing entirely to identify the significance of what a text 
says. Here we may speak of its truth or falsity, its depth or 
shallowness, its relevance or irrelevance, its beauty or plainness, 
and so on. These may change drastically, depending on the 
criteria of evaluation we deploy, on the circumstances in which 
we find ourselves and on the personal commitments of those 
making the evaluation. However we plot the distinction in detail, 
some distinction between meaning and significance will be pressed 
upon us by those who want to stress the crucial role of intentions 
in the act of interpretation. 
It is not entirely clear whether the attack on the role of 
intentions is meant to cut into all of the aforementioned 
assumptions. It may be simply an attack on the status of appeal to 
intentions when they are seen as part of wider battery of evidence 
which might be mustered by an interpreter. Or it may be 
something much more ontological and philosophical. It is 
absolutely crucial that we be clear about this, for there is far more 
to intentions than meets the eye initially.2 This is one of the 
enduring merits of attending to the claims of Derrida among the 
deconstructionists and Rorty among the new pragmatists.3 The 
latter are seeking to undermine in a very profound way the 
epistemological foundationalism which has been central to Western 
philosophy since Descartes. Their work in literary criticism 
generally, and their attack on intentionalism in particular, are part 
and parcel of a wider vision that covers issues which go far 
beyond those encompassed in traditional hermeneutics. An 
innovation of the magnitude they are seeking cannot hang on some 
kind of intentional fallacy, however generously construed; nor for 
that matter can it hinge on appeal to some expert in the field of 
literary criticism. Such an attack will depend on substantive 
philosophical moves in epistemology, and Rorty at least is only too 
aware of the demands that this lays upon both him and Derrida. 
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Indeed, what both Rorty and Derrida want to do is to overturn 
philosophy and epistemology, yet to do so they must deploy 
recognizably philosophical arguments, a feat which no one has as 
yet successfully performed. So we do well to isolate the debate 
about intentions initially as a debate about the status of certain 
kinds of evidence in the interpretation of a text. 
It is not difficult to find fault with the appeal to intentions in 
the interpretation of a text, and ever since Wimsatt and Beardsley 
published their famous article on the "intentional fallacy," many 
have followed their lead in banishing intentions from the process 
of interpretation proper.4 Their strictures about intention were 
initially limited to the interpretation of poetry, but as the debate 
proceeded they were extended to literature generally.s Of late, 
opposition to intentions has been spreading to biblical studies, 
most especially among those who are interested in the literary 
study of the Bible. It is surely not an exaggeration to say that a 
deep division has developed between those who operate 
fundamentally as historians and those who operate fundamentally 
as literary critics. Up ahead it is likely that the division will 
become sharper and deeper. 
The attack on intentions is mounted from a variety of angles. 
The most popular move at first is to point to the simple fact that 
in most cases, say, of the biblical literature, the author's intentions 
are not accessible. Like most simple points, this is expected to 
settle the issue immediately and its proponents hope to return in 
triumph to a closer reading of the text, trusting that they will be 
left alone to get on with their work. If this is all there is to the 
debate about intentions, then indeed the debate is over and we 
had best bury it for good. One could, of course, take the simple 
logical expedient of accepting the consequences of this state of 
affairs and arguing that this does not overthrow the place of 
intentions; it just shows that we are not in a position to interpret 
the relevant biblical material. Biblical scholars need not quit their 
jobs, but they must now earn a living performing other functions 
in the commonwealth of learning. That no one has seriously 
suggested this option should make us pause and ponder what is 
really at stake in the debate as a whole. Those opposed to 
intentions, however, are not going to be satisfied with this abrupt 
attempt to keep the commitment to intentions unharmed and 
intact. So the attack proceeds apace. 
Suppose we have access to the intentions of the author. For 
one thing, our author may have failed to execute her intentions in 
the work in question. Yet this does not render her text 
meaningless or necessarily obscure. Meaning therefore must be 
logically distinct form intentions. For another, the author may 
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have abandoned her original intentions in the course of her work 
or she may have included material which was not at all central in 
her deliberations. If the intentions have in any way changed, they 
can be of no help in determining the meaning of the work in 
hand. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the author best knows 
her intentions. We can all be deceived or ill-informed about our 
intentions. In some cases it even appears that the author had no 
idea what she was up to until the work was finished and she 
turned and read the work for herself, just like any other 
intelligent reader. Privileged access, even if it does exist, does not 
in the least guarantee infallibility; yet only infallibility could 
underwrite the claim that avowals about intentions have a special 
status. Add to this the fact that a text often has a surplus of 
meaning over and above what the author intended. Our author 
may not know the full meaning of what she is saying, or she may 
be incompetent or not inclined to declare what she meant. Surely 
something along these lines lies behind the commonplace among 
Protestants that God has still more light to break from His Word. 
The original author may have only been incipiently aware of what 
she was saying; to limit oneself to intentional meaning is therefore 
restrictive and spiritually debilitating. Texts are far richer than 
the standard intentionalist can allow. 
Furthermore, persons who talk about the intentions of an 
author tend to be general and schematic, so it is not clear how 
precisely they will illuminate this or that part of the text. An 
author's intention to write a satire or a tragedy does not tell the 
reader how to handle the details of the script. Indeed there are 
cases where knowledge of the author's intentions tells us next to 
nothing about the text. Thus, to know that someone wrote a play 
to make a lot of money or to placate an enemy will not get us 
very far in the process of interpretation. Nor can the appeal to 
intentions set any ultimate guard against subjectivity, as Hirsch 
and his admirers so fondly hope, for intentions are by definition 
inward mental acts which are not available for inspection by the 
general public. It is surely better by far to work with the text in 
hand and let its precise and particular features settle whatever 
disputes arise. Textual certainties may not amount to much when 
weighed in the scales of knowledge, but they are all we have and 
they are always to be pref erred to biographical speculations which 
take us away from the text and into the swamps of endless 
background studies and genetic guesswork. 
Finally, there are extra considerations which come into play 
when we deal with a canonical text of Scripture. Text embodied 
in a sacred canon takes on new meaning when read as part of the 
canonical whole. As the biblical writers had no idea that their 
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work would have canonical status, there is no way in which they 
could have intended the meaning that their work now has, given 
its place in Holy Scripture. Attempts to get around this by 
claiming that the intentions of the final editors or canonizers , or 
even God, are to be the bearers of the relevant intentions is just 
one last-ditch effort to save the appeal to intentions. There is 
absolutely no warrant in the texts themselves for such a move; 
only a dogged commitment to theory precipitates such desperate 
expedients. 
The consequences of this attack on intentions are extremely 
significant for hermeneutics. By far the most interesting for our 
purposes is that it calls into question the whole quest to ferret out 
the inner life behind the outer text associated with 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Collingwood. Thus, if this attempt to 
reject intentions succeeds, it will make no sense to speak of the 
interpreter reversing the causal process which brought the text 
into existence or of seeking to relive the thoughts which lie 
behind the text. Exercises of this character will be seen as adding 
nothing to the task of interpretation properly conceived; on the 
contrary, they may well be construed as a devious distraction. To 
be sure, such operations may be of some psychological value in 
drawing attention to evidence within the text which might 
otherwise go unnoticed, but they are of no deep epistemic value 
and they are assuredly not the heart of the interpretive enterprise . 
Those opposed to intentionalism of one sort or another are not 
agreed on exactly what the heart of the enterprise should be . 
Some, especially those impressed by Marx, have turned to the 
social context of a text, as the key to interpretation. How far this 
alternative can avoid an unacceptable form of determinism and 
reductionism cannot be pursued here, but there is no denying that 
placing texts in their wider social setting can be exceptionally 
illuminating and the wise interpreter will develop a keen eye for 
the possibilities which this option may make available. Others, 
especially those interested in the formal f ea tu res and structures of 
language, have turned to a close reading of the text as an 
autonomous object as the hope for the future. The text itself is 
read and reread until it yields up its riches. Again, there is no 
denying the fascinating and penetrating observations which have 
emerged from such endeavour. Others have sought for their 
literary salvation in the mining of continental, hermeneutical 
philosophy and the theories of meaning developed in this fertile 
domain. As some ponder the options, they sometimes gain the 
impression that the task of interpretation has become a thoroughly 
relativistic operation where subjectivism reigns and where there 
are no controls to adjudicate between one interpretation and 
Intentions and the Logic of Interpretation 17 
another. 1 suspect that this reaction reflects panic rather than 
good judgment, but, where sentiments like this prevail, it is small 
wonder that the commitment to intentions as a crucial issue in 
hermeneutics dies very hard indeed. 
If intentions are to be seen as crucial, however, it should not 
be because appeal to intentions is the only way to head off 
relativism or subjectivism. Taking this line, aside from tending to 
beg vital questions against rival visions of interpretation , is likely 
to breed fantasy and confusion in our hermeneutics . If intentions 
are important, it is not just because we want them to be important 
or because we fail to be attracted by anti-intentionalist or non-
intentionalist accounts of interpretation. They should be taken 
seriously because reference to them is logically indispensable in 
any plausible account of interpretation. In recent analytical 
philosophy precisely such an account has emerged over the last 
generation. The account in question began !if e as an attempt to 
solve certain problems in the philosophy of language and was then 
applied to the debate about interpretation. 
Even though the primary work on this issue is highly 
technical, the relevant data for the task of interpretation can be 
stated quite succinctly. The key point to grasp is that the meaning 
of an utterance is not just a matter of the discourse deployed or 
the sentences uttered; it is fundamentally a matter of the speech 
act performed by the speaker on specific occasions in particular 
contexts. Moreover, the speech act performed is in turn 
determined by the intentions of the relevant speaker. Hence the 
interpretation of an utterance, and by extension the interpretation 
of a text, is logically related to the action performed by the person 
or persons who made the utterance or produced the text, and the 
action can only be identified by referring to the intention which 
governs it. 
The standard way to deal with the issue at stake here is to 
attend to what J. L. Austin referred to as the illocutionary force 
of an utterance.6 Thus when someone in normal circumstances 
seriously utters the sentence, "Shut the door," there are three 
distinct elements to be noted. There is the locution itself or the 
locutionary act; the speaker has said this particular sentence. 
There is, secondly, the act performed in what has been said; in 
this case an order has been given. Finally, there is a 
perlocutionary element in that this particular act may have had 
certain effects on its hearer; say, it may have made the hearer feel 
sad. According to Austin and those who have borrowed or built 
on his work, understanding the illocutionary force of an utterance 
is essential to understanding the meaning of an utterance, hence it 
is quite inadequate simply to attend to the public meaning of the 
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sentence uttered . Thus, to take a hackneyed example, if someone 
were to say, "There is thin ice over there," it is essential not only 
to know what the various parts of this sentence mean in English 
but also to know how the speaker is using the sentence. Normally 
we take it as an affirmation, but in various circumstances this 
sentence could be an order, a warning, an insult or a request. To 
know this we need to know the intentions of the speaker in using 
this particular utterance. Discarding any reference to intentions 
and attending closely merely to the locutionary act in question will 
e liminate , therefore, an essential ingred ient in the meaning and 
hence in the understanding of the utterance. What applies to this 
short, pithy utterance also applies to whole stretches of utte rance 
such as we find in written texts. 
Needless to say, various aspects of this proposal have co me 
unde r attack in the philosophy of language .7 Enough of it remains 
intact , however , to cut deeply into the d ebate about intentions. 
What is especially important is the general orientation which it 
gives to the interpretive process. Even if the case has not been 
fully made for intentions as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the identification of illocutionary force, it sets texts 
very firmly in the domain of human actions . So Dilthey and his 
admirers were correct to develop a general hermeneutic which 
would focus on the understanding of human actions generally as 
the key to understanding texts. A text is not so me abstract entity 
floating in free space endowed with meaning by some mystical 
agent called language or discourse. Nor are texts natural objects 
produced by passive, unintentional agents. Whatever else they are, 
texts are fundamentally the fru it of human action and are 
generally created to express human intentions and purposes. 
Speakers produce meaning, not texts per se; in this process they 
make use of discourse, and to reverse this order and focus 
primarily on language and secondarily on what is actually achieved 
by use of language is to get the cart before the horse. As 
Strawson puts it succinctly, " as theorists, we know nothing of 
human language unless we understand human speech." 8 
Hence , when interpreters debate the role of intentions in their 
work it is hope lessly inadequate to resolve this issue simply by 
insisting that we may not have access to the avowals of the author 
as to what he or she meant. To work on this level is to work 
bereft of crucial conceptual tools and thus prevent the relevant 
issues being canvassed appropriately from the outset of the 
discussion. Besides, making an avowal about our intention is only 
one way of getting access to our intention, and we may be more 
or less fallible in our claims in this domain. The text itself will 
be a vital part of the evidence as to what intentions are expressed 
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in the work, and it is the task of the interpreter to develop skill in 
picking up what they are and hence determining what the force of 
the utterance under review may be. Nor will it do to confuse 
intentions with logically distinct matters such as motives, desires, 
feelings and other mental acts and events.9 To do so is to make 
elementary blunders in the philosophy of mind and breed 
unnecessary confusion in the field of hermeneutics. 
Yet we must be careful in all our claims about both human 
actions and intentions . The terrain here is extraordinarily slippery 
and it is easy to fall prey to simplistic theories of action. 
Contrary to the standard orthodoxy on the subject, I seriously 
doubt if a general theory of human action is in fact intellectually 
attainable. This is not to decry the attempt to tie actions to 
intentions conceptually, but I am not fully convinced that all that 
human agents do as responsible agents is done intentionally. It is 
certainly useful to begin with a firm connection between actions 
and intentions, but this is the first word; it is unlikely to be the 
last. Thus I may set out to do x and end up doing y without at all 
realizing what I was doing or intending to do what I did. For 
example, contemporary television evangelists insist that they are 
simply using modern media to spread the old-time gospel, while in 
actual fact many of them are offering a new gospel message and 
their actions are more akin to that of an entertainer than that of 
an evangelist. That they would vehemently reject such a 
description of their action is beside the point. They are simply 
unaware of the social character of their behavior and how it may 
be legitimately understood. If this example seems too 
controversial, consider the situation where I set out to shoot 
Murphy in the Enniskillen stockyard filled with cattle. I fire and 
miss, but my action of shooting scares the cattle and they 
stampede, trampling Murphy to death. Here I have the intention 
to kill Murphy and I kiII him, congratulating myself all the way to 
prison for what I have done; but I do not kill him intentionally . I 
suspect that examples like these may crop up quite frequently in 
our work on human texts, and anti-intentionalists are correct to 
focus on how tricky intentions really are. However, they tend to 
misread the significance of their astute observations by failing to 
see this as a signal to look afresh at the whole notion of action 
rather than as an invitation to focus on texts in themselves. We 
need to pursue the complexity of human speech- acts rather than 
just look again at the language and text. This is what I meant at 
the outset of this paper when I suggested that the debate about 
intentions was misplaced; it is less a matter of the relevance of 
certain kinds of evidence than it is about the total orientation of 
our work in hermeneutics. It is crucial in this orientation to place 
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texts where they belong; in the stream of human life, thought and 
action. 
We might summarize the fundamental thesis we are driving 
towards in this way: Hermeneutics is not so much the study of 
what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. 
If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention 
and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less 
than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and 
charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and 
achievement may coincide more often that not. In any case, the 
old proverb holds; actions speak louder than words; so it is the 
actions which should get our full attention. Moreover, in 
understanding actions we do well to adopt the lofty vision outlined 
by Dilthey: " The ultimate goal of the hermeneutic process is to 
understand an author better than he understood himse lf." 10 This 
is clearly the case with many human actions, and thus we do well 
to set ourselves this task in hermeneutics. In the light of this, the 
task of the interpreter is to summon all the relevant evidence and 
all the ski ll that can be mustered to elucidate the nature of the 
achievement in question . For the author, the road to mea ning is 
paved by good achievements, and the versatile and wily 
interpreter will map out such achievements as lucidly as possible. 
In constructing such maps, it will be useful to bear the following 
general rubrics in mind (all of which stem from construing a text 
as an achievement or an action and all of which have been 
vigorously advocated at one time or another in the history of 
hermeneutics). 
First, it is useful to keep a distinction between the elucidation 
of a text and the evaluation of a text. As with the evaluation of 
actions generally, it is morally required that we know what a 
person has done in some detail before we evaluate the worth of 
what has been done. This holds for the study of action in the 
writing of texts. In the evaluation of a text, it is important a t 
times to bear in mind the intended aim of the author. For 
example, if a writer intended to write a satire or an apocalypse, it 
is clearly erroneous to evaluate such work as if it were a piece of 
sober historical narrative . Intention in itself does not determine, 
in some simplistic fashion, precisely what value we should attach 
to a particular work, but it should be taken into account in the 
evaluative process overall. We may even need to take into account 
the motives of an author as we evaluate a text. Thus, if we know 
that a writer's motive was to smear the good name of an 
opponent, then this will have an obvious bearing on our val ue of 
the worth of the text. The process of evaluation as a whole will 
involve a variety of criteria, depending on our commitments and 
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the express point of our evaluations. The good interpreter will 
develop a high degree of self knowledge in this area without 
sacrificing nimbleness of touch and economy of operation. 
Second, in elucidating a text, it will be crucial to attend to the 
linguistic repertoire of an author. The study of grammar, syntax, 
vocabulary, genre, style, local idioms, usage, and the like, are 
indispensable. In this there is no substitute for the demanding 
task of mastering the original languages. The loss of these in the 
modern seminary is surely to be deeply regretted. Also crucial is 
a knowledge of how to read a book as a whole, dismantle it and 
then put it back together again . Here concessions to the natural 
language of the reader can legitimately be made, and it is crucial 
to bear in mind the communicative conventions Traina has 
captured in his analysis of the relationships to be found with a 
text. 11 We need also to bear in mind the innovations and 
transformations which an author may have introduced. In all, we 
need to know the capacities and range of options available to an 
author in producing a text. If we neglect this, we are liable to 
underestimate or overestimate what has been , or fail to perceive 
what action has actually been performed. 
Third, we need to develop a keen eye for the historical context 
and particular circumstances in which a text has been written. At 
this point, the current wrangle between historians and literary 
critics is of deep significance. It is certainly true that historians 
have not always served us as well as they might. As far as the 
interpretation of Scripture is concerned, they have at times 
dismantled the texts into atomistic bits and pieces, they have lost 
the text in a mass of genetic and background information, they 
have indulged in fanciful speculation which is intellectually 
unedifying, they have set unduly restrictive limits on the options 
open to the contemporary theologian, and they have arrogantly set 
aside exegetical insights from the astonishingly rich heritage of 
interpretation which is available to us. Whatever catalogue of sins 
we cobble together, we cannot ignore history if we construe the 
interpretation of a text as the interpretation of a human 
achievement. Achievements take place in a context and in a set of 
circumstances. To understand them is to see them as making sense 
within the conventions, assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes 
of their situation. Hence our knowledge of an author's repertoire 
of linguistic action depends on historical information about the 
period and the circumstances of the actual writing. Those who 
focus on a close reading of the text as an autonomous object 
either ignore this at their peril or smuggle precisely such 
information into the interpretive process without acknowledgment. 
There is another reason why history is important. Some texts 
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cannot be understood at all adequately if we do not know 
something about the ideas and the events concerning which they 
speak. If we read a text ahistorically in such circumstances we are 
liable to go astray. Equally, if a writer is making a rejoinder to 
another text, it is important that we have access to such 
information. Thus, if an interpreter insists that Job is a response 
to Deuteronomy, or that James is a response to Paul, we need the 
aid of the historian in evaluating such claims. How we resolve 
these issues will have a clear bearing on the illocutionary force of 
much of what is said. We cannot say in advance when or how 
historical information will be relevant. Some texts are more 
heteronomous than others, but even in seemingly autonomous 
books like Proverbs it is exceptionally illuminating to have some 
idea of the proverbial repertoire available at the time of writing, 
the traditions out of which the book emerges, and the way in 
which the current text of Proverbs may represent or depart from 
these conventions. Of course our judgments in history are 
invariably contested , and it is easy to be carried away by those 
alternatives which chime with our prepossessions. The sensitive 
interpreter will soon learn to make a virtue of such necessities 
while taking with radical seriousness the canons of historical 
judgment. 
It is in this context that we should deal with the place of a 
text within the canon of Scripture as a whole . Two points deserve 
mention. First, it is both important and useful to see what 
happens to our understanding of a text when it has been placed in 
a sacred canon by a community of faith . It is best to designate 
our intellectual undertakings at this level not as the elucidation of 
the text but as the careful integration of the content of a variety 
of texts in a wider theological vision. When we appropriate the 
significance of a text of Scripture and relate it intimately to our 
expanding metaphysical commitments, how we do so will depend 
in part on how we relate that text to our understanding of other 
relevant, scriptural texts. Significance, in turn , will depend on 
elucidation in the sense that we cannot satisfactorily gauge the 
value of a text without first knowing what the text means. He nce 
we need to tread warily when claims are made about the canonical 
meaning of a text. Perhaps we should speak of canonical 
significance rather than canonical meaning . 
Second, when we deal with the text as part of the canon of 
Scripture much more attention needs to be given to the broader 
historical considerations which are at stake. The process of 
canonization was part of a wider enterprise which the early church 
initiated in order to deal with its life and teachings in the crises 
which it faced over several centuries. Thus to cope with its 
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problems, the church not only put together a canon of Scripture, it 
also developed various creeds and put episcopacy in place. On an 
intellectual level, there is a deep sense in which creed and 
Scripture go together canonically, while episcopacy can be read as 
an attempt to secure these canons as integral to the social authority 
of the church and as constitutive of its identity. Much harm has 
been done in Protestantism when this is neglected. Scripture has 
been called upon to perform functions which were designed to be 
met by the creeds, and the creeds have been ignored or neglected 
in the canonical construal of Scripture. A canonical reading of 
Scripture which fails to take into account the early creeds of the 
church is therefore historically inept, and this is one more reason 
for treating the canonical interpretation of Scripture at the level of 
significance and appropriation rather than at the level of 
elucidation and exegesis. 
In conclusion, one further point springs naturally to mind in 
our brief comments on the rubrics of interpretation. When we 
deal with a text, we cannot ignore the subject or particular 
content in which the writer is engaged. To take a simple example, 
adequate elucidation of a classical philosophical text depends in 
part on one's capacity to understand philosophical ideas and issues. 
The good interpreter will be able to draw on insights which have 
been furnished by wrestling with the questions the text addresses 
and with rival ways of construing and resolving them. Initially, 
one's capacity in this field may well develop by means of 
extensive interaction and dialogue with the text in hand . More 
appropriately, we might say that our reading of a text is like a 
dialogue with an author or speaker whose action continues across 
space and time into the present to inform and develop our 
judgments and latent human capacities. 
This is clearly the case with Scripture. Deep and profound 
elucidations of the text depend on spiritual insight and on 
theological sensitivity as well as on standard linguistic, literary and 
historical skill. This is as it should be if the interpretation of a 
text is the interpretation of a human achievement, for this is 
inevitably set in the stream of human life, thought and action. 
Out of the richness of their experience, the depths of their 
theological acumen, the storehouse of their ability to communicate 
their proposals, the great interpreters take the reader into a new 
world of wonder and challenge where fresh horizons are 
encountered and prevailing capacities are developed. It is 
impossible to capture what is at stake here in a set of formal rules 
or in conceptual analysis of the underlying assumptions and 
principles. These have their place, but they are no substitute for 
direct exposure to those who have already mastered this art and 
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can share it with others. In this respect it is difficult to surpass 
what Robert Traina instantiates for those fortunate enough to have 
been his students. · 
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